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BORIS I. BITrKER-
THE abandonment by a majority of the Supreme Court, in recent
years, of an earlier majority's ill-starred attempt to find in the Four-
teenth Amendment a prohibition against multiple state taxation of
intangibles evoked law review comment in profusion. 1 In declaring
that this prohibition, once seen so clearly by Mr. Justice McReynolds, 2
was only a mirage, 3 the Court did not so much establish a new horizon
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale School of Law; formerly Chief of the Liquida-
tion Section of the Alien Property Custodian Office.
1. See, for example, Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1938 Term
(1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1; Nash, And Again Multiple Taxation? (1938) 26 GEo. L. J.
288; Traynor, State Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1938 Term (1939) 28 CALIF. L. RFV.
1; Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes are Certain-But what of Domicile (1939) 53 HARV.
L. REv. 68. For discussion of the earlier law, see Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582; Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166.
A comprehensive bibliography may be found in MAGILL AND MAGUIRE, CASES ON Ts LAW
OF TAXATION (3d ed. 1940) 401 n.
2. "A very large part of the country's wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose
protection against discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of the greatest
moment. . . [E]xisting conditions . . . imperatively demand protection of choses in
action against multiplied taxation ..... Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.
204, 212 (1930), overruling contrary views expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903), which apparently had been regarded as authoritative as re-
cently as 1925. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925). See Sachs, The Saga of Black.
stone v. Miller: A Study in Multiple State Taxation in MATHEWS AND HART (eds.), ESSAYS
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1937) 231. Mr. Justice McReynolds read this "imperatively de-
mandled] protection" into the Fourteenth Amendment by a tour de force, saying "we can
find no sufficient reason for saying that they [intangibles] are not entitled to enjoy an im-
munity against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to tangibles."
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra at 212. In so doing, he found it convenient
to ignore the facts (1) that the constitutional basis upon which the Court had earlier re-
stricted multiple taxation of tangibles [the impossibility of physical location in more than
one state at a time; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905)]
has no applicability to intangibles, and (2) that the Supreme Court, in establishing the
single tax rule for tangibles, had expressly recognized an "obvious distinction" between
tangible and intangible property (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra
at 205) which warranted the double standard for which Mr. Justice McReynolds could
find "no sufficient reason." The demise of Blackstone v. Miller evoked some of Holmes'
most outspoken dissents. See, for example, Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930):
"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing
scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the consti-
tutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky
to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for
any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us
carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." See also 2 HoLw.nis-
POLLOCK LETTERS (1941) 267-71.
3. "We find it impossible to say that taxation of intangibles can be reduced in every
case to the mere mechanical operation of locating at a single place, and there taxing, every
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as reestablish an old one. For Mr. Justice Holmes had said, years
before, that however undesirable multiple taxation of intangibles
might be, correction must be sought elsewhere than in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 There has been, however, a curious disinclination on
the part of both the Court and its observers to examine critically the
basis upon which the Fourteenth Amendment continues to shelter
out-of-state tangible property from property and death taxes of the
state where the owner resides; indeed, reaffirmation of the Amend-
ment's protective force as to tangibles is to be found in the very deci-
sion which, denying that protection to intangibles, said:
".. . it is undeniable that the state of domicile is not deprived, by
the taxpayer's activities elsewhere, of its constitutional jurisdiction
to tax, and consequently that there are many circumstances in
which more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax
and measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles." 3
It is the thesis of this article that the Fourteenth Amendment affords
no valid basis for denying to the domiciliary state a correspondingly
broad power to tax a resident's tangibles, without regard to their
location. 6
The principal focus of what follows is this constitutional issue, al-
though something will be said, in conclusion, of the social desirability
of taxing out-of-state tangibles. By way of anticipation, it may be
legal interest growing out of all the complex legal relationships which may be entered into
between persons .... The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be carried out with such me-
chanical nicety without infringing powers which we think have not yet been withdrawn
from the states." Curry v. MIcCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 373 (1939). See also State Tax Com-
mission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942), overruling First Nat. Bank v. Maine,
284 U. S. 312 (1932) and reinstating the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller, ISS U. S. 189
(1903), cited supra note 2.
4. "It seems to me that the result reached by the court probably is a desirable one,
but I hardly understand how it can be deduced from the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 211 (1905). See also Blackstone
v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 204-5 (1903).
S. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 368 (1939), cited supra note 3. In this case
Mr. Justice Stone says of the doctrine that tangibles are taxable only by the state where
located that "its survival and the consequent cleavage between the rules of law applicable
to tangibles and those relating to intangibles are attributable to the exclusive dominion
exerted over the tangibles themselves by the government within whose territorial limits
they are found." Id. at 364. But see Mr. Justice Jackson's speculation in his disent in
State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 201 (1942): ". . . since the Due
Process Clause speaks with no more clarity as to tangible than as to intangible property,
the question is opened whether our decisions as to taxation of tangible proparty are not
due to be overhauled." See also (1940) 54 HARV. L. REv. 151, 152, suggesting "a re-exani-
nation of the possibility of double taxation of tangible personal property." And Eee (1940)
40 COL. L. REv. 725, 731: "The distinction between tangibles and intangibles is a superficial
one for tax purposes. .... "
6. See note 115 infra.
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noted that, since state death taxes are graduated according to the
decedent's wealth, there seems to be no reason of social poliky why
out-of-state land, art objects or other tangibles should be excluded
from the taxable estate when mortgages on out-of-stateland and de-
posits in out-of-state banks are included. Different issues of policy are
posed by the ad valorem property tax, which almost universally has
become a localized levy on real estate quite unrelated to net wealth,
because assessment machinery is not geared to include property out-
side the local district and is not likely to be retooled for that purpose;
in those states where the property tax is still employed as a levy upon
total wealth, however, the inclusion of out-of-state tangibles could
substantially expand the taxable base. In any case, tax practice should
be governed by local policy preferences rather than coerced by a con-
stitutional doctrine which has never been subjected to careful analysis.
I
The immunity of land located in State A from both ad valorem and
death taxation by State B, the domicile of its owner, has long been
considered so self-evident that judicial dignity precludes discussion
of its basis in legal principle or social policy.7 But chattels did not
7. "Indeed, we know of no case where a legislature has assumed to impose a tax upon
land within the jurisdiction of another State, much less where such action has been defended
by any court. It is said by this court in the Foreign-held Bond case, 15 Wall. 300, 319 (U. S.
1873), that no adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a proposition as
that property lying beyond the jurisdiction of a State is not a subject upon which her taxing
power can be legitimately exercised." Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U. S. 194, 204 (1905). The second sentence is, of course, question-begging, and furnishes
no guide by which one can decide whether "property" is "beyond the jurisdiction of a
State" if the person who possesses some or all of the rights to deal with or dispose of it is
within the State. Yet such feeble substitutes for reasons are comm6n. See Louisville &
Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 396 (1903) where the Court said that
the power to tax "is limited by a principle inhering in the very nature of constitutional
Government, namely, that the taxation imposed must have relation to a subject within the
jurisdiction of the taxing Government." These and similar platitudes no doubt derive from
the resounding pronouncement of Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 429 (U. S. 1819): "All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state
extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the
soundest principles, exempt from taxation." Compare Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting, in
State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 201 (1942): "I find little difficulty
in concluding that exaction of a tax by a State which has no jurisdiction or lawful authority
to impose it is a taking of property without due process of law. The difficulty is that the
concept of jurisdiction is not defined by the Constitution." The due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment does not encumber the federal taxing power with the restrictions imposed
upon the states by the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942) §§ 2.08-
10; Wurzel, Foreign Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 809;
Notes (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 687; (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 500. Paul, ibid., states that "any
lingering doubts" as to the power of the United States to tax foreign real estate should be
[Vol, 56: 640
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gain a parallel immunity from property taxation until the dawn of the
twentieth century, and did not ,in freedom from multiple death taxes
for another quarter-century.8 As late as 1886, Mr. Justice Bradley
regarded with equanimity the possibility that the state of domicile
might tax a resident's tangible personalty, wherever located, on the
theory that it was "part of his general estate attached to his person,"
and held that it was "hardly necessary to cite authorities on a point so
elementary" as that the state where the chattels were kept might also
impose a property tax.9 During the nineteenth century "no restrictions
were placed upon the power of the State to levy a tax measured by all
the movable property, wherever situate, of any persons domiciled
within that State." 10
It was not until 1905 that the Supreme Court first clearly conferred
on chattels the same immunity from multiple taxation that had long
been enjoyed by land. When Kentucky sought to tax a local corpora-
tion on a fleet of migratory railroad cars used almost entirely outside
the state, the Supreme Court held, in Union Refrigerator Transit
Company v. Kentucky," that since Kentucky rendered no protection
or other "benefit" to the cars, imposition of the tax was in violation of
the due process clause of the 'Fourteenth Amendment.12 While this
view was not entirely without harbingers, 3 it was the first to supply
ideological ammunition to the campaign against double taxation:
removed by Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924), upholding a federal income tax upon a non-
resident citizen's income from real estate located abroad. In New York ex rd. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937), the Court upheld the power of a state to tax a resident's in-
come from real property located outside its territorial limits, but only on the theory that
"the incidence of a tax on income differs from that of a tax on property."
8. Courts did, however, show a marked tendency to construe statutes as not intended
to include extra-territorial chattels, particularly by refusing to apply the maxim miomid
seguuntur personam when the statute embraced only property "within the state," Hoyt v.
Commissioners, 23 N. Y. 224 (1861), Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350 (1904),
or by declining to permit double taxation in the absence of irrefutable evidence that the
legislature intended it. But the power of the legislature was admitted: "That the legislature
has power to impose a tax on residents upon the personal property owned by them, no
matter where the same is situated, is conceded." Weaver's Estate v. Iowa, 110 Iowa 328,
330, 81 N. W. 603 (1900); see lAGIML AND MAGUIRE, CAsEs oN TaE Lxw oF T-:Tio.N-
(3d ed. 1940) 313-4. But cf. Matter of Estate of Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 84, 32 N. E. 1096,
1097 (1893).
9. Coev. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 524 (1886).
10. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATiON OF PROPERTY AND INcoME (1933) 10.
11. 199 U. S. 194 (1905). "... this decision, by reason of its full and lucid exposition
of the concept of due process as a basic requirement of taxing jurisdiction, rightly deserves
to be ranked the leading case upon the subject." Merrill, Jurisdicdion to Tax-Anolher
Word (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 582, 584-5.
12. If the Union Refrigerator Transit Company had been taxed only on a propor-
tionate or "average" basis, the assessment would have included annually between 28 and
67 of its 2000 cars. 199 U. S. 194, 195-6 (1905).
1:3. See Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903); Dela-
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"The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every
civilized government, is exercised upon- the assumption of an
equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person
and property, in adding to the value of such property, or in the
creation and maintenance of public conveniences in which he
shares, such, for instance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements,
and schools for the education of his children. If the taxing power
be in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit the
person or property taxed, and such property be wholly within the
taxing power of another State, to which it may be said to owe an
allegiance and to which it looks for protection, the taxation of such
property within the domicil of the owner partakes rather of the
nature of an extortion than a tax, and has been repeatedly held by
this court to be beyond the power of the legislature and a taking
of property without due process of law." 14
A second ground of the Union Refrigerator Transit decision, which
is hardly more than a restatement of the first, was that the fleet of
cars was beyond the "territorial jurisdiction" of Kentucky:
"It is also essential to the validity of a tax that the property shall
be within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power. Not only
is the operation of state laws limited to persons and property
within the boundaries of the State, but property which is wholly
and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another State, receives
none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be the com-
pensation." 16
This "reason," like the first, rests upon the unarticulated assumption,
which will be analyzed further below, that the "protection" for which
the tax is the quid pro quo must be furnished to the physical objects by
which the tax is measured rather than to the owner or to the owner's
bundle of rights, powers, and privileges with respect to the physical
objects. The Court moves from this assumption, by way of the weasel
phrase "territorial jurisdiction," 18to a foregone conclusion.
The court's alchemy not only transmuted into constitutional dogma
the "benefit" theory of taxation, which even then enjoyed something
less than universal loyalty from economists,1 7 but imposed the addi-
ware L. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 355 (1905); ef. Commonwealth v. Ameri-
can Dredging Co., 122 Pa. 386, 390-1, 15 Atl. 443, 444 (1888). For earlier cases resting on
general theories of jurisdiction rather than on the Fourteenth Amendment, see Goodnow,
Congressional Regulation of State Taxation (1913) 28 POL. Sci. Q. 405, 408-13.
14. 199 U. S. 194, 202 (1905).
15. Id. at 204 (1905).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOY, Bk. V, c. II, § 2; Cf. SELIOGMAN, ESSAYs
IN TAXATION (1921) 333-8 (originally published in 1908); SMUTu, THE WEALTu OF NATIONS,
Bk. V, c. II, Part 2; SCHULTZ, AmERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE (1942) 283-5; WELLS, THE
TIEORY AND PRACTICE OF TAXATION (1900) 222-3.
[Vol. 56: 640
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tional restriction that the "benefit" conferred by the state would not
support a tax, at least if it is called a "property" tax, unless somehow
related to the property as well as to its owner. Yet this restriction,
for some unexplained reason, is apparently applicable only if the
"property be wholly within the taxing power of another state;" at
least these words have furnished the escape route by which the Court
has upheld the taxability of a resident's property when, notwithstand-
ing its permanent location outside the taxing state, it would otherwise
go tax free. The classic instance is Southern Pacific Company v. Ken-
tucky, 1 which sustained a tax levied by Kentucky on a fleet of steam-
ships owned by a local corporation but permanently employed on the
high seas. Yet if the due process clause is violated by a tax on railroad
cars which receive no police or comparable protection from Kentucky,
how can an exception be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to sup-
port the taxation of the Southern Pacific Company's ocean-going
steamships? The fact that these vessels receive no taxable "protection"
from their ports of enrollment or call in no way increases the "protec-
tion" afforded to them by Kentucky. Nor can any reason of social
policy be found in these circumstances for conditioning taxability at
home on immunity elsewhere. If the Southern Pacific Company can
be required to contribute, in proportion to its total wealth, to the sup-
port of the state from which it has received its corporate charter, why
should not the Union Refrigerator Transit Company do likewise, even
though the latter-because of additional benefits received from another
state-may also be paying a tax there?
If the territorial limit on taxation which -the Court found in the
Fourteenth Amendment is not consistently observed with respect to
tangible property, it is ignored-as it must be--when intangibles are
the subject of taxation. For when the state requires its citizens to in-
clude the value of money owed to them in reporting their taxable
wealth, even the impressive maxim molia sequuntur personam cannot
conceal for long the fact that the "property" being taxed is neither
within nor without the state's territorial limits. A debt has no physical
location, even though the debtor and creditor have, nor does it receive
the kind of physical protection from the police and fire departments
that allegedly is the exclusive basis for taxing land, railroad cars, or
other tangible property.' 9 Nonetheless, a person to whom money was
owing-far from being relieved of all taxation because of the spiritual
nature of his property-could be taxed, at the time the Union Refrig-
18. 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
19. With respect to intangible property, "jurisdiction has not been thought to depend
on any factor other than the domicile of the owner within the taxing state, or to compel the
attribution to intangibles of a physical presence within its territory, as though they were
chattels, in order to support the tax." Mr. Justice Stone, in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S
357,366-7 (1939).
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erator Transit case was decided, by both the debtor's state and his
OWn1.
20
Recognizing that an immunity was being conferred upon chattels
which was not then enjoyed by intangibles, the Court in Union Refrig-
erator Transit Co. v. Kentucky found an "obvious distinction" between
tangible and intangible property, in that the latter is "held secretly"
so "that there is no method by which its existence or ownership can
be ascertained in the State of its situs, except perhaps in the case of
mortgages or shares of stock." The Court also asserted that even if the
non-resident owner is known, there is no way of collecting the tax
except in the state of his domicile.
The fact that intangible property is "held secretly" was thought to
warrant its treatment as fair game by the tax assessors of both the
creditor and debtor states, double taxation being constitutionally un-
exceptionable because "it much oftener happens that this class of
property escapes altogether." The sins of some mortgagees were visited
upon others, as it were; one had to pay double to compensate for the
evasions of another.21 In relieving the owners of tangibles of such
vicarious liability, the Court asserted but made no effort to prove that
tangibles cannot be as easily hidden from the tax collector as intangi-
bles. But the accuracy of this assumption is far from obvious. The
domiciliary state must depend upon the taxpayer's honesty for dis-
closure of his out-of-state property, whether in the tangible form of
real estate, railroad cars, and precious metals, or in the intangible form
of mortgages, bank deposits, trust funds, or securities. The non-
domiciliary state, of course, can find the non-resident's real property
by examining the land records in the county clerk's office, but it also
can find his mortgages recorded there. Bank deposits, trust funds,
securities, and unsecured loans no doubt are more difficult to track
down, but local debtors, fiduciaries, and corporations could be required
to file information returns, or disclosure could be made a condition to
20. In Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879), the Court had upheld the power of
the creditor's state to impose an ad valorem property tax: "The debt is property in his hands
constituting a portion of his wealth, from which he is under the highest obligation, in com-
mon with his fellow-citizens of the same State, to contribute for the support of the govern-
ment whose protection he enjoys." Id. at 498. For the validity of a similar tax by the
debtor's state, at least when the debt was evidenced by a bond, note or mortgage, see Sav-
ings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898) and New Orleans v.
Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899). Both the creditor's and the debtor's state had jurisdiction
for death tax purposes, Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903). For the vicissitudes of
this doctrine, see notes 2 and 3 supra.
21. As Powell has pointed out in another connection: "It is of course a matter of
chance whether the owners who are caught are the same as those who have escaped. Only
when they are, can the propertytaxed be regarded as representative of what had previously
passed by unscathed." Comment, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota: State Taxation of Air-
planes-Herein Also of Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars (1944) 57 HARv. L. R.v,
1097, 1098.
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local enforcement of the obligations by the non-resident.22 While
devices of this type are far from perfect, there is no reason to suppose
that they are not at least as effective as any measures which can be
devised to search out movable tangibles, like railroad cars, works of
art, precious metals, and the like, which a non-resident may choose to
use or conceal within the jurisdiction. To the extent that the constitu-
tional distinction between tangibles and intangibles must rest on the
greater ease with which the former can be found by the tax collector,
it is on flimsy underpinnings indeed.
Nor does the other branch of the not so "obvious distinction" be-
tween tangibles and intangibles-that it is impossible to collect the
tax from the non-resident owner of intangibles-appear provable, even
if it could otherwise be thought to furnish an adequate basis for con-
stitutional differences. It is entirely possible that we are on the thresh-
hold of a breakdown of the doctrine, sanctified by nothing beyond age,
that one state will not enforce the tax laws of another.2 3 Even Aithout
such an addition to the tax collector's arsenal, however, more than one
technique is presently available for collecting a tax from a non-resident
owrer of intangible property. The most obvious would be garnish-
ment of the non-resident's bank deposits, loan, and other credits in a
fashion comparable to the assertion of a tax lien on real property.
Restraints on the transfer of corporate stocks and bonds until non-
resident owners thereof have paid all personal property taxes would be
another effective device. Similarly, enforcement in the taxing state's
courts of debts or other obligations might be prohibited whenever the
taxes thereon are delinquent. 24 So far as death taxation is concerned,
the intangible property of a non-resident decedent is easily reached by
virtue of familiar statutory provisions forbidding the transfer of prop-
erty except with the consent of the state taxing officers-.2 These devices
for collection differ in detail from, but are not necessarily less effective
than, the lien and foreclosure method which must be used for collecting
taxes due in respect of the non-resident's tangible property. The as-
sumption that intangibles are more likely than tangibles to go entirely
22. See, for example, Alark-ell v. Kahlkoff, 258 Ky. 231, 79 S. W. (2d) 984 (1935);
McLaughlin v. Cheney, 172 Okla. 562, 46 P. (2d) 352 (1935); Poss v. Albert, 139 Tenn. 1,
200 S. IV. 976 (1918). See further LELAND, THE CLASSIFIED PROPERTy TAucx Ln Tan UNiTED
STATES (1928) 145-6.
23. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, - Mo. App.- ,
193 S. IV. (2d) 919 (1946); see Note (1946) 165 A. L. R. 796. Leflar, Exraslate Enforcement
of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HARV. L. REv. 193; Freeze, Exlralcrritoria! En-
forcement of Revenue Laws (1938) 23 VAsH. U. L. Q. 32; Daum, Inlerstale Comity and Gov-
ernmental Claims (1938) 38 ILL. L. REv. 249; Comment (1935) 48 HAxtv. L. REv. 828.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. The C. C. H. State Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Tax Service sets out, wth statu-
tory references, the requirements of each state as to consents by the local taxing authority
to the transfer of a decedent's assets. See paragraph 2300 ff. for each state.
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unscathed by taxation unless more than one state has authority over
them cannot survive analysis; yet this false assumption forms the very
foundation of the "obvious distinction" between tangibles and in-
tangibles which has been thought to support taxation of the latter at
the owner's home as well as elsewhere while denying parallel taxability
of the former.
Nevertheless, this differentiation persisted for many years without
significant alteration as the justification for the double standard in the
Fourteenth Amendment's behavior toward the taxpayer. But when
the Supreme Court at its 1929 Term opened its campaign against
multiple taxation of intangibles,2" the "obvious distinction" quite
naturally fell into desuetude. In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minne-
sota,27 the Court held that the power to tax the testamentary transfer
of state and municipal bonds (and, by implication, other choses in
action) lies exclusively with the state of the creditor's domicile. Now
the Court, though not losing sight of the "obvious distinction," sought
to assimilate the treatment of intangibles with that of tangibles:
"We have determined that in general intangibles may be properly
taxed at the domicile of their owner and we can find no sufficient
reason for saying that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity
against taxation at more than one place similar to that accorded to
tangibles. The difference between the two things, though obvious
enough, seems insufficient to justify the harsh and oppressive dis-
crimination against intangibles contended for on behalf of Minne-
sota." 28
The war on double taxation lasted long enough to stimulate a host of
comments and at least two books 29 and to cripple a growing move-
ment for statutory adjustment of the conflicting claims of the several
states.30 Then the Court abandoned the struggle as to intangibles.
26. An early foreshadowing of the 1929-1930 campaign is to be found in State Tax on
Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1873), "perhaps the most misunderstood, mis-cited,
and abused case in the law relating to taxation." HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION Op PROP-
ERTY AND INCOME (1933) 29. This case has been all things to all men. See the summary of
the variegated "explanations" of its meaning in HARDING, ibid.
27. 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
28. Id. at 212.
29. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933), reviewed by
Magill (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 794, and by Rottschaefer (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 670;
STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933), reviewed in (1934) 47 HARV.
L. REv. 1466.
30. At the time First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932) was argued, thirty-
seven states had enacted reciprocity statutes exempting from death taxes the local intangible
property of decedents domiciled in states which bestowed a similar immunity on their own
citizens. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 197 (1942). See also
Brady, Death Taxes-Recent Statutory and Judicial Solutions of Multiple Taxation (1930)
16 A. B. A. J. 532; Faught, Reciprocity in State Taxation as the Next Step in Empirical
(Vol. 56: 640
HeinOnline -- 56 Yale L.J. 648 1946-1947
19471 TAXATION OF OUT-OF-STATE TANGIBLE PROPERTY 649
But there was no retreat from its single tax doctrine for tangibles; in
Curry v. McCanless,31 the most unequivocal though not strictly the
first 32 announcement that the war was over, Mr. Justice Stone revived
the double standard, borrowing from his dissenting opinion in an earlier
case 33 a long passage to refurbish the old "obvious distinction" with a
more elaborate analysis:
"That rights in tangibles-land and chattels-are to be regarded
in many respects as localized at the place where the tangible itself
is located for purposes of the jurisdiction of a court to make disposi-
tion of putative rights in them, for purposes of conflict of laws, and
for purposes of taxation, is a doctrine generally accepted both in
the common law and other legal systems before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and since. Originating, it has been thought,
in the tendency of the mind to identify rights with their physical
subjects, see Salmond, Jurisprudence (2nd ed.) 398, its survival
and the consequent cleavage between the rules of law applicable
to tangibles and those relating to intangibles are attributable to
the exclusive dominion exerted over the tangibles themselves
by the government within whose territorial limits they are found.
. . . The power of government and its agencies to possess and to
exclude others from possessing tangibles, and thus to exclude them
from enjoying rights in tangibles located within its territory, af-
fords adequate basis for an exclusive taxing jurisdiction. When we
speak of the jurisdiction to tax land or chattels as being exclusively
in the state where they are physically located, we mean no more
than that the benefit and protection of laws enabling the owner to
enjoy the fruits of his ownership and the power to reach effectively
the interests protected, for the purpose of subjecting them to pay-
ment of a tax, are so narrowly restricted to the state in whose
territory the physical property is located as to set practical limits
to taxation by others. Other states have been said to be without
jurisdiction and so without constitutional power to tax tangibles
if, because of their location elsewhere, those states can afford no
substantial protection to the rights taxed and cannot effectively
lay hold of any interest in the property in order to compel pay-
ment of the tax." 34
In its twin emphasis upon the protection afforded to tangible property
by the state of its location and upon the ease with which a tax may be
Legizlation (1944) 92 U. oF PA. L. R~v. 258; Comment, Reciprocal and Rctaliatory Tax
Statutes (1930) 43 HAnv. L. REv. 641; Comment (1940) 26 IowA L. Rxv. 694; cf. SEN. Dac.
No. 69 (Federal, State, and Local Government Fiscal Relations) 78th Cong., 1st Sr.3.
(1943) 490-6.
31. 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
32. See 307 U. S. 357, 363 n. 1; cf. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506
(1938); First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937).
33. Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (1935).
34. 307 U. S. 357, 363-4 (1939).
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collected there, Mr. Justice Stone's rationale invites the same criticism
as did the Union Refrigerator Transit Company case: if the owner of
deposits in out-of-state banks or of mortgages on out-of-state land
may be taxed because he enjoys the privileges of residence, citizenship,
incorporation, or the like in the state of his domicile, why is not the
enjoyment of similar privileges by the owner of out-of-state land or
railroad cars a sufficient basis for taxing him? 11 Indeed, if the Supreme
Court were consistently to deny taxing jurisdiction to "those states
that can afford no substantial protection to the rights taxed and can-
not effectively lay hold of any interest in the property in order to com-
pel payment of the tax," 31 it could not accommodate a case like South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky.37 In fact, no out-of-state property, whether
tangible or intangible, would meet the test, unless the "rights taxed"
which must be "protected" are the various rights which make up owner-
ship, in which case the way would be equally open to taxation on both
classes of property.
This suggestion leads us to an appraisal of Mr. Justice Stone's
analysis of the basis upon which jurisdiction to tax intangibles rests:
viz., that intangibles, being legally enforceable "relationships between
persons," "cannot be dissociated from the persons from whose relation-
ships they are derived" and may be taxed by the state in which those
persons enjoy the benefits of government.38 This realistic analysis of
intangible property affords a more secure foundation for "jurisdiction"
to tax intangibles than the stilted and rarefied language of "situs," 11
but in burning away the tangled underbrush Mr. Justice Stone, un-
wittingly perhaps, set fire to the trees as well. For any post-Hohfeldian
lawyer will ask almost instinctively if "tangible property" is not also
composed of legally enforceable relationships between persons, or if
tangibles any more than intangibles can be "dissociated"-' 'as sources
of actual or potential wealth"-"from the persons from whose relation-
ships they are derived." The owner of a plot of land or of a railroad
car ("tangibles") is just as much dependent as the owner of a share of
corporate stock or of a promissory note ("intangibles") upon judicial
assistance in requiring other persons to act or refrain from acting in
various ways. The fact that the landowner's rights are often, with
perhaps pardonable hyperbole, denomfnated rights against "all the
35. Compare Holmes, dissenting, in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S.
83, 97 (1929): "Taxes generally are imposed upon persons, for the general advantages of
living within the jurisdiction, not upon property .... The notion that the property must
be within the jurisdiction puts the emphasis on the wrong thing."
36. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939).
37. 222 U. S. 63 (1911), cited with approval by Mr. Justice Stone in his dissenting
opinion in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 309, 312, 314 n. 2 (1944).
38. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 366 (1939).
39. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
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world" should not obscure a recognition that, in protecting his rights,
the courts are concerning themselves with "relationships between
persons" (between the owner, his agents, assignees, heirs, etc. and his
neighbors, visitors, trespassers, etc.) and that any "control of a physical
thing" is exerted chiefly by judicial orders directed to persons. Apply-
ing this analysis, which is so fully developed in the writings of Hohfeld
and Cook,4 one could easily paraphrase Mr. Justice Stone:
"[Rights to land, railroad cars, and art objects] are but relation-
ships between persons, natural or corporate, which the law recog-
nizes by attaching to them certain sanctions enforceable in courts.
...They can be made effective only through control over and
protection afforded to those persons whose relationships are the
origin of the rights. ... Obviously, as sources of actual or poten-
tial wealth-which is an appropriate measure of any tax imposed
on ownership or its exercise-they cannot be dissociated from the
persons from whose relationships they are derived."
Justice Stone's failure to accept the full consequences of his ovn
aialysis reflects the quaint notion, sanctified by usage, that an ad
valorem tax is laid "on" the property taxed 41L-meaning, in the case of
land or railroad cars, "on" the physical object itself. He suggested that
the localization, for judicial purposes, of rights in land and chattels
at the place where the physical object is located may have originated
"in the tendency of the mind to identify rights with their physical
subjects" 42 and argued that the survival of this view and the conse-
quent cleavage in legal treatment of tangibles and intangibles "are
attributable to the exclusive dominion exerted over the tangibles them-
selves by the government within whose territorial limits they are
found." 'We are not told why the identification of rights with physical
objects which has led to so much confusion 41 should be perpetuated
nor whether it can find any support in terms of current social needs.
40. HoHFELi, FuNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 28-30, 73-95; Coon, THn
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942) 284-300; Cook, Rascission
of Bargains Made on Sunday (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 165, 173-9; Comment (1926) 35
YALE L. J. 357. Note Holmes: "All rights are intangible personal relations between the
subject and object of them created by law." Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99,
110 (1921).
41. See Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166; cf. note 35
supra.
42. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 364 (1939).
43. Compare Holmes: "The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give a
rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely
clothed." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921). The very passage cited by Stone to
support his historical explanation says that the confusion of rights with physical objects has
given rise to an "unfortunate attempt" to classify rights (as well as objects) as either "move-
able" or "immoveable." According to S.LtSOND, JuRisPRuDENcE (9th ed. 1937) § 155:
"It is clear that the distinction between movables and immovables is in truth
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While Mr. Justice Stone did not address himself to the desirability
of perpetuating the confusion between rights and objects, he came
very close to giving us an answer. He said, for example, that taxation
"is but a means of distributing the cost of government among those
who are subject to its control and who enjoy the protection of its laws"
and that wealth "is an appropriate measure of any tax imposed on
ownership or its exercise. '"4 If so, why should a discredited tendency to
confuse rights with objects serve to deny to a state the power to re-
quire one who is subject to its control and, who enjoys the protection
of its laws to contribute to its support in proportion to his wealth
wherever, and in whatever form, it may be invested? Some states may
choose to exempt some or all wealth invested in another jurisdiction,
either by including only local investments in the definition of taxable
wealth or by allowing an offset of out-of-state levies against local
taxes. But these are-or should be-matters of local social policy
rather than inflexible doctrines of constitutional law.
While in the field of ad valorem taxation the confusion of rights with
objects finds some explanation-if not an excuse-in the traditional
view that the tax is "on" the object taxed rather than "on" the owner
or his wealth, there is not even this reason for confusing the two in the
case of death taxes. Even the orthodox view is that such taxes are
and in fact applicable to material objects only. Yet the law has made an unfortu-
nate attempt to apply it to rights also. Rights no less than things are conceived by
the law as having a local situation, and as being either movable or permanently
fixed in a definite locality. The origin of this illogical conception is to be found In
the identification of rights of ownership with the material things which are the ob-
jects of them. I am said to own land and chattels, as well as easements, shares,
debts, contracts, and patents. All these things are equally property, and since some
of them have a local situation and can be truly classed as movable or immovable,
the law has been led by inadvertence to attribute these qualities to all of them. It
has recognised in things which are incorporeal certain attributes which in truth per-
tain to things corporeal only. It has divided the whole sphere of proprietary rights
by reference to a distinction which is truly applicable not to rights at all, but to
physical objects."
On this theory, debts have their situs "where the debtor resides, since it is there that the
creditor must go to get his money." The conceptualistic thinking that Salmond engages in
cannot be appreciated without reading his work, and it is little short of astounding that
Stone should take seriously what even Salmond recognized as an "illogical conception."
It is especially surprising since only a page or two earlier in the same opinion Stone had
pointed to the impossibility "of attributing a single location to that which has no physical
characteristics." 307 U. S. 357, 362-3 (1939). And on an earlier occasion Stone had written:
"The Fourteenth Amendment did not adopt as ultimate verities the quaint distinctions
taken three centuries ago by Sir Edward Coke between things that savour of the realty and
other forms of right, and between corporeal and incorporeal rights. In applying the Four-
teenth Amendment we may recognize, what he failed' to realize, that all rights are incor-
poreal. . . ." Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 438 (1935). See also Hom tLD, loc. cit. supra
note40.
44. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 370, 366 (1939).
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levied "on" the privilege of transfer, or of succession, rather than on
the property. 45 Moreover, since only rights can be transferred at death
or inherited,40 a tax measured by the value of the decedent's entire
estate could be upheld on the ground that the property transferred
(i.e., rights, i.e., "relationships between persons") is within the taxing
jurisdiction of the state where the decedent lived because it has con-
trol over at least one of the parties (the decedent's executor) to the
relationship which is being altered. Any argument based on the dom-
iciliary state's lack of power to prescribe the succession to tangibles
located elsewhere, unless the state of situs concurs, runs afoul of the
fact that it similarly lacks power to govern the testamentary transfer
of a chose in action or of a share of stock if the state where the obligor,
debtor or corporation is located prescribes a different succession.
III
It should occasion no surprise that the courts have floundered hope-
lessly in applying a distinction which stands on such an uncertain legal
foundation and is so singularly deficient in economic significance as
that between tangible and intangible property. Differences of degree
we must expect in the law, and the judicial task is above all the draw-
ing of lines; 41 but where the extremes themselves do not differ sig-
nificantly from each other, any boundary line between them is pecul-
iarly unacceptable. Even a cursory survey will uncover a number of
conceptual frontiers which, born of judicial desperation, can hardly be
expected to survive for long.
Interests in land. A convenient starting point is Senior v. .Braden,43
holding Ohio powerless to impose its personal property tax on certain
land trust certificates evidencing a resident taxpayer's beneficial
interest in parcels of real estate, located without the state, the legal
titles to which were held under declarations of trust by trustees. Each
declaration of trust required the trustee to hold and manage the prop-
erty for the benefit of the certificate owners and to distribute the in-
come or proceeds of sale to them in proportion to their interests. It
was conceded by the state, with "commendable frankness," according
45. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 352-3 (1945); United States Trust Co. v.
Helvering, 307 U. S. 57 (1939); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900). While characteriza-
tion of the federal estate tax as being "on" the privilege of transfer rather than "on" the
transferred property has been motivated by the constitutional distinction betwveen direct
and indirect taxes, state death taxes have been similarly characterized. Se Stebbins and
Hurley v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137 (1925); Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392,408 (1907).
46. See RESTATE--mSNT, PRoPERTY (1936) §§ 12-3.
47. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F. (2d) 631, 647 n. 15 (C. C. A.
2d, 1946).
48. 295 U. S. 422 (1935). A forerunner of Senior v. Braden is Narragansett Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Burnham, 51 R. I. 371, 154 AUt. 909 (1931).
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to the Court, that if the tax were being assessed against "land or in-
terests in land," it would be unconstitutional.4" The Court held that
the taxpayer owned not a bundle of equitable choses in action, taxable
as intangible property, but rather interests in the lands which con-
stitute the corpora of the trusts. Mr. Justice Stone, with whom Justices
Brandeis and Cardozo joined, dissented."
It is plain folly to have airy distinctions like that between "equitable
chose in action" and "interest in land" control the citizen's duty to
contribute to the support of his government in proportion to his means.
If Mr. Senior had invested his money in the shares of a real estate in-
vestment corporation 51 or in mortgage participation certificates 52
rather than in fractional trust certificates, he would have been liable
for the claimed tax, notwithstanding the absence of any substantial
economic differences in his investment position. The manipulation
of legal concepts, solely to create "a tax-free form of investment," 61
has not obscured recognition by other courts that Ohio land trust cer-
tificates are used "in financing real estate loans as a substitute for an
outright mortgage," 14 nor has it prevented the owners of such cer-
tificates from obtaining federal income tax benefits on a plea that the
instruments, though creating a trust on their face, are in reality only a
mortgage. 5  The Supreme Court, failing to take judicial notice of what
49. This concession was thought to be compelled by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 295 U. S. 422, 426. The concession was also made with respect to
similar certificates evidencing the ownership of real estate located within the state, because
Art. XII, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution permits taxation of land and improvements only by
"uniform rule according to value," while the questioned tax statute, Onio SEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1937) §§ 5388-9, imposed upon "productive investments" a tax measured by income
yield while taxing "unproductive investments" according to "the true value thereof."
50. For a sprightly dissection of the Court's opinion, see RODELL, WoE UNTO You,
LAWYERS! (1939) 103-34. For analogous problems, see Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County,
273 U. S. 113 (1927); Note (1945) 156 A. L. R. 22, 193-6.
51. Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1914); cf. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357,
365 n. 3 (1939). It is worthy of note, moreover, that the owners of shares of a corporation
which does not pay local taxes on its property may constitutionally be taxed more heavily
than the owners of shares of a corporation that does. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors,
282 U. S. 19 (1930).
52. See.Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 365 n. 3 (1939); Kirtland v. Hotchkiss,
100 U. S. 491 (1879).
53. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Rawson, 56 Ohio App. 388, 11 N. E. (2d) 110, 112
(1937); Nitkey v. Ward, 199 Minn. 334, 271 N. W. 873 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 706,
775 (1937); City Nat. Bank Bldg. v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 216, 222 (App. D. C. 1938). For
more detailed discussion see Goldman and Abbott, Land Trust Certificates (1928) 2 U. OF
CIN. L. REV. 255.
54. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 481, 482 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U. S. 704 (1941).
55. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252 (1939); Commissioner v. H. F.
Neighbors Realty Co., 81 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936). See also I re Euclid Doan Co.,
104 F. (2d) 712 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939), declaring a trust deed to be a mortgage for purpose of
bankruptcy administration.
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was "common knowledge" 11 in Ohio, looked only to the face of the
documents, and found that the owner had an interest in land.
Actually, the most significant issue in the case (whether "interests in
land" are comparable, tax-wise, to land) was conceded by the state.
Yet the reasoning employed in the Union Refrigerator Transit case to
confer immunity from taxation upon out-of-state tangible property has
no applicability to subordinate or partial interests in such property.
For the bedrock of the immunity doctrine is that immune property is
protected only by the state where it is physically located, that it is
"visible" and thus easily found by the tax collector, and that it is
therefore "obviously" different from intangible property. An interest
in land, whether it is the interest of a mortgagee, unpaid vendor,
equitable owner, beneficiary of a trust, or whatever, has all the char-
acteristics which, according to the court in the Union Refrigerator
Transit case, subject intangible property to taxation by the state of
the owner's domicile, while it shares none of the characteristics which
were thought to confer a parallel immunity on tangible property. The
concession of counsel for the state in Senior v. Braden enabled the
Court to evade the task of explaining how an immunity possessed by
property solely because of its physical characteristics could also be
claimed on behalf of interests in that property.
Equitable conversion. The doctrine of "equitable conversion" also
serves to illustrate how shadowy is the boundary between tangible and
intangible property. The "mysterious statements" 57 found in opinions
and treatises that land is "equitably converted" into money imme-
diately upon the making of a contract for its sale have been imported
from unrelated fields of the law into the law of taxation 3 The original
importers were the Pennsylvania courts, which employed the doctrine
for the purpose of subjecting to the state inheritance tax the transmis-
sion at death of land lying outside the state. The equitable catalyst
was employed because the taxing statute did not embrace the transfer
of land outside the state; , the exclusion was rendered partially in-
effective by judicial holdings that if the testator had by %%ill directed
that the land be sold rather than transferred directly, the direction
would be regarded as having "worked an equitable conversion" of the
56. See note 53 supra.
57. Coox, TnE LOGICAL. AND LEGAL BASES OF TEm CoxFIzcT oF L~ws (1942) 256.
58. For a survey of the principal fields in which the doctrine of equitable conversion
has found application, see Simpson, Legislatire Changes in the Law of Equitable Conrersion by
Contract (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 559, 754; cf. Stone, E.uitable Conrersior. by Contract (1913)
13 COL. L. REv. 369. While recent discussion has centered on conversion by contract, the
doctrine is also applied, and indeed is of principal importance taxwise, where there is a testa-
mentary direction to sell rather than an executory contract of sale. See Po!Mnoy, EQtnuT
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 161, 371, 1159-78; MA'rnAND, EomT" (2d ed. 1936)
277-86. For an early American discussion, see Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563 (U. S. 1818).
59. Commonwealth v. Coleman's Administrator, 52 Pa. 46S (1866).
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land so that the value thereof could be subjected, like personalty, to
the tax. 0 The Pennsylvania doctrine was followed by other states, but
did not command general acceptance."' As a device for subjecting out
of state tangibles to local property taxes, equitable conversion has
apparently been employed rarely if ever, notwithstanding its use in
allocating the burden of such taxes as between vendor and purchaser
of land subject to an executory contract of sale. 2
For all the confused and confusing conceptual nonsense which it
has spawned, the doctrine of equitable conversion may possibly serve
useful ends-in other fields than taxation. 3 It may be, for example,
that a testator who by will directs his executors to sell his real estate
intends the proceeds of sale to descend to his legatees rather than to
his devisees. If so, the doctrine of equitable conversion is a harmless
rationalization to promote the decedent's wishes, though at best it "is a
name given to results reached on other grounds, not a fact from which
we may reason for all purposes and with respect to the rights of all
parties." 64 But it is preposterous that the amount of taxes on an
estate should be greater if the executors have been instructed to sell
real estate than if they had been directed to transfer it directly to the
beneficiaries.
As indicated above, the doctrine was used principally to reach
property otherwise beyond the taxing state's "jurisdiction." Because
of a statutory exemption of non-residents' intangibles," however, the
doctrine occasionally redounded to a taxpayer's benefit by immunizing
from Pennsylvania taxes local land owned by a non-resident testator
who had fortuitously or by design included the magic direction to sell
in his will." In view of the doctrine's admitted function, it may be
60. Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 321, 2 AtI. 492 (1886); cf. Drayton's Appeal,
61 Pa. 172 (1869).
61. Following Pennsylvania: In re Estate of Sanford, 188 Iowa 833, 175 N, W. 506
(1919); Land Title & Trust Co. v. Tax Commission, 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189 (1925).
Dissenters included New York, Matter of Estate of Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096
(1893); Maryland, State v. Fusting, 134 Md. 349, 106 Ati. 690 (1919); and Illinois, Connell
v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350 (1904); cf. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 197 Mass. 248,
83 N. E. 881 (1908); State v. Brevard, 62 N. C. 141 (1867); Northern Trust Co. v. United
States, 15 A. F. T. R. 841 (E. D. Mo. 1932). See also Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 426. A sur-
prising wrinkle is found in In re Marx' Estate, 226 Iowa 1260, 286 N. W. 422 (1939), stating
that even if certain real estate "took on the form of cash as the result of sate, it still remained
tangible property. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1.,, Id. at 1265, 286 N. W. at 424.
62. On allocation of property taxes, see HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON VENDOR
AND PURCHASER (1933) 324-38.
63. See note 58 supra.
64. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919-Equity (1920) 33 HARv. L. RuV. 813,
832.
65. In re Small's Estate, 151 Pa. 1, 25 Ati. 23, 27-8 (1892).
66. Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. 231, 28 AtI. 137 (1893). As a corollary to the abandon-
ment of the doctrine as to locally owned out-of-state property after Frick v. Pennsylvania,
[Vol. 56: 640
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surprising to note that it was unceremoniously jettisoned'by the Penn-
sylvania courts immediately after the Supreme Court decided, in
Frik v. Pesylvania,7 that tangible property outside the state could
not be included in computing death taxescs True, this was the first'
authoritative ruling that death taxes could not ward off the Union
Refrigerator Transit doctrine by a liberal application of the theory that
they were imposed upon the privilege of transfer rather than on the
object transferred.s But it had long been acknowledged by the Penn-
sylvania courts, even without an encyclical from on high, that out-of-
state land was beyond its taxing power; and equitable conversion was
regarded as compatible with that constitutional limitation. 0 The fact
that the Supreme Court conferred upon tangible personalty the immu-
nity previously enjoyed by real estate had no clear bearing on the
conversion fiction.7 1
Yet the doctrine's abandonment, whether under constitutional com-
pulsion or through excessive caution, was hardly to be regretted. Dur-
ing its lifetime it had contributed only one more capricious element to
the field of taxation. The absurdity of endowing with tax consequences
268 U. S. 473 (1925), the doctrine was also abandoned as to local property owned by a non-
resident. Commonwealth v. Presbyterian Hospital, 287 Pa. 49, 134 At. 427 (1926).
67. 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
68. In re Robinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 308, 312, 132 At. 127, 128 (1926): "Here the
property involved consists of 'immovable realty' in Illinois, and, under the Frick decision,
it cannot be changed by a fiction of law into money in Pennsylvania for purpose of taxation
in this state." Iowa has apparently followed Pennsylvania's lead in abandoning equitable
conversion. In re Marx' Estate, 226 Iowa 1260, 286 N. W. 422 (1939). See alko 4 C. C. H.
STATE INHERITANCE ESTATE AND GI=r TAx SERV. % 1605A (7th ed. 1944), for rulings by
the Attorneys General of Maryland, New Hampshire and South Dakota.
69. Previously the view had been widely held that the Union Refrigerator doctrine
did not apply to estate or inheritance taxes. See People v. Kellogg, 26S 11. 489, 109 N. E.
304 (1915); In re Gumbinner's Estate, 92 Misc. 104, 155 N. Y. S. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1915); Note
(1926) 42 A. L. R. 327.
70. The original Pennsylvaiiia collateral inheritance law of 1826 taxed only property
within the state, Act of April 7, 1826, DIG. PA. LAws: 1700-1830 (Purdon, 1831) 150,
but in 1887 the operation of the law was expanded to embrace, inter alia, "estates situated
in another State, Territory, or country, when the person, or persons, dying ceized thereof,
shall have their domicile within this Commonwealth. . . ." Pa. Laws 1887, No. 37, p. 79.
This extension was held unconstitutional shortly after its enactment on the familiar ground
that "real estate is not drawn to the domicile of the owner, for taxation or any other purpose,
and hence cannot -be taxed outside of the jurisdiction where it is situate." Estate of Bit-
tinger, 129 Pa. 338, 345, 18 Atl. 132, 133 (1889). See also In re Vanuxem's Estate, 212 Pa.
315, 322, 61 Atl. 876, 879 (1905): "It was not pretended that the real estate in other states
could be charged with collateral inheritance tax [by Pennsylvania) as real estate, but only by
reason of the fact that it was necessary for the executors to sell it, in order to provide the
money to pay the pecuniary legacies." Indeed, in the Frick case itself real estate located
outside Pennsylvania was excluded from the taxable estate. In re Frick's Estate, 277 Pa.
242, 250, 121 At!. 35, 38 (1923).
71. The Pennsylvania court went even farther in In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330,
154 AUt. 503 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 630 (1931), holding that an inheritance tax could
HeinOnline -- 56 Yale L.J. 657 1946-1947
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
such an ecoromically neutral fact as the presence (or absence) of a
direction for the sale of land was exceeded by only one thing: if the
state of domicile adopted the fiction while the state of situs rejected it,
the land shouldered a double tax burden, while if the situation was
reversed, the transfer might go tax-free.7 2
Negotiable Instruments. What is the status taxwise of those types of
property which, though of a representative or evidentiary character,
are by commercial custom treated as valuable in themselves? 71 Exam-
ples are, on the one hand, warehouse receipts, which are backed up by
tangible property, and, on the other, bonds and notes, which evidence
promises. For many years, bonds were held to be "in such a concrete
tangible form that they are subject to taxation where found, irrespec-
tive of the domicil of the owner." 14 In rationalizing this treatment of
bonds in the same fashion as railroad cars, land, or cattle, Mr. Justice
Holmes argued that "a tradition which comes down from more archaic
conditions," 11 accepted by "the usages and views of business men," 7
had resulted in identifying the promise to pay with the paper on which
the promise was written. If then a state may tax a non-resident who
keeps bonds within its boundaries, why not a similar tax when bills
and notes owned by a non-resident are kept within the state? This,
too, was upheld by Mr. Justice Holmes; to the argument that bills and
notes were only "evidences" of the promise to pay, the loss or destruc-
tion of which would not discharge the obligation, he answered only
that in modern times even a bonded indebtedness may be enforced
without producing and surrendering the paper." Interestingly enough,
however, the doctrinal legacy from an "archaic" past which permitted
negotiable instruments to be taxed like tangible property did not
abridge taxability of the obligation at the owner's domicile and at the
not be levied on the unpaid purchase money for real estate which the decedent had con-
tracted to sell during his lifetime, the deeds to which were not executed until after his death.
A dissenting judge pointed out that the states where the rdal estate was located, New Jersey
and Missouri, would apply the doctrine of equitable conversion by contract so as to free the
land from death taxation. See Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 793; Comment (1936) 46 YALE
L. J. 272.
72. See Commonwealth v. Presbyterian Hospital, 287 Pa. 49, 134 At. 427 (9216);
In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931); Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 687.
73. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81:50, for the federal estate tax treatment of the prop-
erty of nonresidents: ". . . iT]he written evidence of intangible personal property which
is treated as being the property itself [is] within the United States if physically situated
therein." For similar problems in another field, see Andrews, Situs of Intangibles for Suits
Against Nonresident Claimants (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 741.
74. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S: 309, 322 (1899).
75. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 206 (1903).
76. Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 439 (1914).
77. Ibid; cf. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S.
392, 403 (1907); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 161 (1907)0
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debtor's as well.7 8 Negotiable instruments, then, enjoyed, or suffered,
an ambivalent life: tangible so as to be taxable where found, intangible
so as to be taxable also at the domiciles of both the owner and the
debtor.
So the matter rested until the late twenties, when the Supreme
Court's crusade against double taxation swept Mr. Justice Holmes'
rationale into the scrapheap.7 The Court then held that bonds were
"representative and not the thing itself" and that, like other negotiable
instruments, they could not be differentiated from "ordinary choses in
action," 81 ordinarily taxable at the owner's domicile and not else-
where. Mr. Justice McReynolds, regarding the similarities between
negotiable instruments and "tangible" property as more important
than their differences, concluded that such choses in action (and, in-
deed, all "intangibles"), like tangibles, should be immune from taxa-
tion by more than one state. With the abandonment of the crusade
against double taxation 81 negotiable instruments presumably are once
again subject to taxation wherever the documents themselves are
found, notwithstanding the modification by the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law of the "archaic" tradition which formerly underlay such
taxability.82 And although the instruments are treated as tangible
property by the state of their physical location, they are no doubt
sufficiently intangible to be subjected to taxation also by the domiciles
of both debtor and creditor.83
78. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 498-9 (1879): "The creditor, it is conceded,
is a permanent resident within the jurisdiction of the State imposing the tax. The debt is
property in his hands constituting a portion of his wealth, from which he is under the highest
obligation, in common with his fellow-citizens of the same State, to contribute for the sup-
port of the government whose protection he enjoys.... That bond, wherever actually
held or deposited, is only evidence of the debt, and if destroyed, the debt-the right to
demand payment of the money loaned, with the stipulated interest-remains. Nor is the
debt, for the purposes of taxation, affected by the fact that it is secured by mortgage upon
real estate situated in Illinois. The mortgage is but a security for the debt...." See also
Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (1881). As to the power of the debtor's state to tax,
see Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205-6 (1903).
79. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 14 (1928); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minne-
sota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930).
80. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 15 (1928); Farmers Loan &Trust Co. v. Min-
nesota, 280 U. S. 204, 209 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930).
81. With the overruling of First National Bank v. Maine, 281 U. S. 312 (1932) by
State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942), it can hardly be thought that
Baldwin v. Missouri. 281 U. S. 586 (1930), survives.
82. A negotiable instrument is discharged by its intenlional cancellation by a holder,
but a cancellation which is unintended or made by mistake or without the holder's author-
ity is inoperative. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT'S LAW §§ 119(3), 123.
83. "It is much too late to contend that domicile alone is insufficient to give the domi-
ciliary state the constitutional power to tax a transfer of intangibles where the owner, though
domiciled within the state, keeps the paper evidences of the intangibles outside its bound-
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So much for negotiable instruments. What of documents which,
though non-negotiable, are nevertheless of great commercial impor-
tance, like deeds to real estate, contracts for the purchase of land, and
similar evidentiary instruments? So long as there was vitality to the
tradition by which the obligation of a bond was discharged (or ren-
dered unenforceable) by destruction of the document, there was some
justification for making a distinction between a bond and a document
which was only evidence of an obligation. Even though'the distinction
might not be of sufficient economic significance to warrant a difference
in taxability, it was at least possible to say that a bond-unlike other
contracts-resembled a railroad car in that the destruction of either
would clearly make the owner a poorer man. But once the law had
reduced bonds to the rank of "evidence," the production of which was
not essential to the obligation's enforceability, retention of the distinc-
tion could adduce neither logic nor business experience in its support.
If keeping a bond or promissory note within the state confers taxing
jurisdiction, why should not similar consequences be attached to a
deed or a written contract for the purchase of real estate?
Yet the Court never took this step. Even Mr. Justice Holmes seem-
ingly conceded that deeds or writings required to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds would not be analogous to negotiable instruments.84 Faced
squarely with the question of the taxability of non-negotiable ware-
house receipts under circumstances where the warehoused property
had its physical location beyond the state's borders, Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
"Bonds can be taxed where they are permanently kept, because
by a notion going back to very early law the obligation is, or origi-
nally was, inseparable from the paper or parchment which ex-
pressed it. . . .But a warehouse receipt does not depend upon
any peculiar doctrine for its effect. . . .As a key to the goods a
receipt no more can be called a second property of equal valte
than could a key to an adamantine safe that could not be opened
without it be called a second property of a value distinct from but
equal to that of the money that the safe contained. . . . It cannot
be assumed that a good title to the [warehoused] whiskey could
not have been given while the receipts were outstanding. We
assume that they made it very unlikely that it would be, but the
practical probability does not make the instrument the legal equiv-
alent of the goods." 85
Much of what Holmes says here of non-negotiable receipts would be
equally true of negotiable receipts and indeed of any negotiable in-
aries." Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly, 319 U. S. 94, 96 (1943); cf. State Tax
Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 181-2 (1942).
84. Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 438-9 (1914).
85. Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 200, 204-6 (1909).
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strument, but it is reasonably apparent that, in his view, negotiability
would have conferred taxability. Yet can it be seriously maintained
that a taxpayer who owns negotiable warehouse receipts has received
more benefits from the state of residence or that his ability to pay for
the benefits he has enjoyed has been increased by the negotiability of
his receipts? Conversely, is there any justification in social policy for
relieving a citizen from a tax imposed by the state of his residence be-
cause he warehouses his goods in another state under non-negotiable
receipts or because he so indorses his negotiable receipts as to destroy
their negotiability?
Money. The uncertain fashion in which the courts have treated
money furnishes a minor but nonetheless instructive instance of the
unworkable distinction between tangibles and intangibles. In Blodgett
v. Silberman,ss the Court held that bank notes and coin kept by a
Connecticut decedent in a New York safe deposit box were "tangible
property" which could not "be distinguished from the paintings and
furniture held in the Frick case" 11 and hence were not subject to a
Connecticut death tax. In the same case, the Court upheld the tax
as applied to "bonds of the United States and certificates of indebted-
ness of the United States," similarly kept in a New York safe deposit
box, on the ground that they "are at most choses in action and in-
tangibles." In lumping coins and bank notes together, the court was
on firm ground. Coins have intrinsic value, of course, while paper
money merely attests to the deposit of metal in the Treasury or con-
sists of promises to pay on demand.ss But there is no economic basis for
differentiating one type of money from another for tax purposes, and
the Legal Tender Act s9 has obliterated even what vestigial legal distinc-
tions might formerly haire been thought of significance. Yet if federal
reserve notes are, taxwise, "tangibles" like coins and share their immu-
nity from tax at the domicile, what sensible basis can be found for
saying that the Government's promise to pay, when expressed in a
bond or certificate of indebtedness, is an "intangible" and hence sub-
ject to tax at the decedent's domicile? The problem was clearly recog-
nized by the taxpayer in Blodgett v. Silberman, who conceded that the
bank notes "on the face show that they are only a promise by the bank
or government, as the case may be, to pay gold or silver on demand,"
but argued that "this technical characterization as a mere promise to
86. 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
87. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
88. See NUSSBAUm, MoNEY IN TnE LAW (1939) 85-7, 185-98.
89. 48 STAT. 113 (1933), 31 U. S. C. § 462 (1940). The Act provides in part that "All
coins and currencies of the United States (including Federal Reserve notes and circulating
notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking associations) heretofore or hereafter
coined or issued, shall be legal tender for all debts, public and private, public charges, taxes,
duties and dues.... ." See TRAN, The Doodle Bug, in Mn. Turr's CAsa Boom (1936) 305.
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pay is . . . over-ridden by common practice and recognition of these
notes as the money itself." 11 This argument was apparently accepted
by the court; at any rate, it vouchsafed no other reason why some gov-
ernmental promises should be taxed differently from others.
The mystery thickens when one tries to find a rational basis for tax-
ing deposit accounts differently from money in safe deposit boxes. The
absurdity of doing so was pointed out long ago by Holmes, then Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:
".. . [I]t would be a matter for regret if a technicality having no
relation to the policy of the law principally concerned should make
the difference as to whether that law applied or not. If the statutes
do not mean to tax identified money in the hands of a receiver
when he locks it up in his box in the safety vault of a bank, natu-
rally their policy would be to leave it equally untaxed if he adopted
the more usual course of depositing it to a special account. To the
business mind one transaction is just like the other. . . .The legal
difference between the two has little or no relation to the principle
of the tax." 91
Later, while on the United States Supreme Court, Holmes said that the
"practical similarity [between "money in the bank and actual coin in
the pocket"] more or less has obliterated the legal difference." 92 The
"legal difference" was not completely obliterated, however, and twenty-
five years later its vestiges were still of such potency that a bank deposit
could be held to be an "intangible" with taxable situs at the owner's
domicile, while bank notes and coin constituted "tangible property"
taxable only at their physical location.9"
More than one taxpayer, building on the "tangible" nature of money,
has sought to save taxes by transactions which, though economically
pointless, were thought to have legal significance. In 1935 an ingenious
physician, resident in Oregon, instructed an Illinois trust company to
purchase for his account $450,000 of federal reserve notes, which he
then transferred, concededly in contemplation of death, to the trust
company as trustee under an irrevocable trust for the benefit of certain
relatives. Later his executors, asserting that the notes were tangibles
beyond the taxing jurisdiction of Oregon, resisted an Oregon tax upon
their transfer in contemplation of death. Although this contention was
successful in the Oregon Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the state court, holding in Pearson v. McGraw 11 that
90. Brief for Executors, p. 25, Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
91. City National Bank v. Charles Baker Co., 180 Mass. 40, 42, 61 N. E. 223, 224
(1901); cf. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 316 (1899); Matter of Houdayer, 150
N. Y. 37, 40, 44 N. E. 718 (1896).
92. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205 (1903).
93. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
94. Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U. S. 313, 317 (1939).
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"the various steps in the series must be considered as constituting but
one integrated and indivisible transaction." Mr. Justice Stone and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred on the ground "that there is nothing
in the Constitution to compel a state to treat federal reserve notes for
tax purposes as chattels were treated in Frick v. .Pennsylvania." 15
A similarly ingenious but unsuccessful scheme was under review in
Van Dyke v. Wisconsin Tax Commission.G The taxpayer, a resident of
Wisconsin, went to Chicago and on demand obtained seven and a half
tons of silver dollars in payment for $270,000 in called Liberty bonds.
Still in Chicago, he transferred the "tangibles" in trust for the benefit
of other residents of Wisconsin. Thereafter the trustee-donees resisted
a Wisconsin gift tax assessment on the ground that the gift was of
"tangibles" located outside the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
passing over the question of the "nature" of the silver dollars, held
that this was a unitary transaction and hence taxable. The Supreme
Court affirmed per curiam, 7 on the authority of Pearson v. .cGraw.
No one can quarrel with either of these decisions. Yet they leave
unscathed the notions that there are differences for tax purposes
between money in a safe deposit l~ox and money in a deposit account
or between the government's promise to pay when expressed on an
interest-bearing instrument and its promise embodied in a non-interest
bearing obligation. Consequently a state of residence cannot tax
money which a taxpayer keeps in another state, so long as he hoards
it in the form of cash and does not deposit it in a bank or invest it in
zovernment bonds.
IV
The doctrine of the Union Refrigerator Transit case would be difficult
enough to apply if one had to do no more than determine whether a
particular portion of a taxpayer's wealth is tangible or intangible prop-
erty. But even after a legal taxonomist has classified property as
tangible and has found that it is beyond the state's territorial bound-
ary, there is still ample opportunity for a law suit to decide whether its
absence from state A is the kind of absence which bars a tax by that
state and, conversely, whether its physical presence in state B is, tax-
wise, legal presence there. The simple test of Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky--is or is not the taxed property within the
state's geographical boundaries?-has been qualified and complicated
so as to be worthy of a lawyer's attention, though in the process the
convenience of tax officer and taxpayer alike has passed into obscurity.
Moveable property poses the issue; the two leading cases involve art
95. Id. at 320.
96. 235 Wis. 128, 292 N. NV. 313 (1940).
97. Van Dyke v. Wis. Tax Commission, 311 U. S. 605 (1940).
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collections lent by their owners to out of state galleries. In Frick v.
Pennsylvania,98 the Court rejected a transfer tax imposed by Penn-
sylvania, the decedent's domicile, upon an art collection kept by him
in New York City, in a building constructed for that purpose, on the
ground that the property had its "situs" in New York and that, there-
fore, the transfer "occurred under and in virtue of the jurisdiction and
laws" of that state exclusively. In the subsequent case of City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader19 the Supreme Court had to pass upon
another Pennsylvania transfer tax, this time levied upon a generous
resident of New York who, thinking that Pennsylvania, too, sheltered
persons of aesthetic inclinations, had lent his art collection to a museum
in Pennsylvania. To the argument that the pictures did not lose their
New York situs by temporary absence from that state, the Supreme
Court answered that the decedent "permitted the pictures to be kept
and used in the Pennsylvania museum merely subject to his right at
any time to order them taken to New York or elsewhere." The Court
went on to hold that by sending the pictures to Pennsylvania and fail-
ing to have them returned to New York, and by "his lack of definite
intention ever so to do," the decedent failed to maintain a "situs" for
the pictures in New York and created one for them in Pennsylvania,
thereby entitling that state to assess a death tax on their transfer. 100
Presumably if the decedent had intended (or, rather, if there had been
satisfactory proof of his intention) to bring the pictures back to New
York, that state rather than Pennsylvania would have had exclusive
power to tax the transfer at death. 101
The Union Refrigerator Transit case, as suggested above, had warned
of the possibility that, in disregard of the "benefit" theory, taxability
of absent property by the state of its owner's domicile might depend in
part upon its non-taxability elsewhere.102 That possibility might have
been confined to cases of property which would otherwise go taxfree,
like the ocean-going vessels involved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Ken-
tucky "I or railroad cars which are so vagrant in their movements that
they cannot be tagged for taxation by any of the states through which
they pass. If immunity at the owner's domicile is to be denied to such
property, both the tax officials and the taxpayer can, by an examina-
tion of relatively accessible facts, decide whether a tax is payable or
98. 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
99. 293 U. S. 112 (1934).
100. Id. at 120-1.
101. Compare Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 402
(1907): "The law may well regard the place of their [certain notes'] origin, to which they
intend to return, as their true home, and leave out of account temporary absences, however
long continued."
102. Supra, p. 644-5.
103. 222 U. S. 63 (1911)..
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not. But the Frick and Sclzder cases introduce an elusive element
into the calculations of tax collectors and taxpayers alike, by basing
taxability on the taxpayer's intentions with respect to his property.104
One thinks instinctively of the unsatisfactory experience with the con-
templation of death provisions of the estate taxes.101 What Randolph
Paul has said in another connection of the difficulty of probing into
motive is of equal applicability to the problem at hand:
". .. Too much should not be expected of the courts, for they
are presented in most cases with carefully assembled evidence in
proof of motive, which is a highly elusive, subjective test of taxa-
bility ... "
"The road of exploration is always obstructed where an in-
terested taxpayer has a monopoly of vital knowledge." 1CG
Moreover, there will be little opportunity to reconcile the clash which
will result when the courts of state A decide that T intended to confer
only a temporary boon on the citizens of state B, with the firm purpose
of bringing his art collection home, at the same time that the courts of
state B hold that T, despairing of the low cultural level in his home
state A, unquestionably intended to keep his collection permanently
in the more appreciative atmosphere of state B.117 It hardly seems
necessary to point out that the benefit theory-which is the very heart
of the doctrine that tangible property is taxable where located-is dis-
missed in cases like Frick and Sciduader with indecent callousness, since
the police protection afforded by the state of location (and the absence
thereof in the state of the owner's house) is just as plain when the
owner intends to bring his collection home as it is when he intends to
leave it away from home. In these cases, protection without intent is
ineffective to support the tax, while intent without protection is ef-
fective.
V
Emphasis has been placed in this article on the constitutional
propriety-rather than the desirability or feasibility-of taxing tangi-
104. See Brock & Co. v. Supervisors, 8 Cal. (2d) 286, 65 P. (2d) 791 (1937).
105. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GnFT TAXATiON (1942) 243-5, 279-81; Pavenstedt,
Taxation of Transfers in Contemplation of Death: A Profiosal for Abolition (1944) 54 YALE
L. J. 70.
106. PAUL, op. cit. supra note 105, at 279, 1124-5.
107. The unlikelihood of federal intervention to resolve conflicting determinations of
such an issue as the testator's intentions with respect to particular property is indicated by
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937), discussed at length by Nash,
And Again Multiple Taxation (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 288. See also Tweed and Sargent, Dealh
and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile (1939) 53 HARv. L. Rnv. 6S; ef. Te as v.
Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939). For statutory grapplings with the problem, see NaVw Yoi=
TAx LAW § 249-0; MASS. LAws AxN., c. 65B (1945); Guterman, Rc italization of Multiple
State Death Taxation (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 1249, 1278-9.
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ble property located outside the state. The administrative machinery
by which local real property taxes, the backbone of the county and
municipal financial structure, 08 are levied, is of course not presently
equipped to assess a resident's out-of-state real property. Nor, as has
been suggested, is it likely to be revamped for that purpose, even under
postwar conversion plans, not only because other reforms are more
urgent,109 but also because the assessment of out-of-state property
would require a revolutionary departure from the fundamental con-
ception of the real property tax as a peculiarly local levy on the real
estate within the taxing district. As presently conceived, the tax has
no relationship to the taxpayer's net wealth or ability to pay,' and
even property located in another taxing district within the state is not
subjected to a tax by the district of the taxpayer's domicile. So long
as the local real property tax retains this character, then, the constitu-
tional "immunity" of out-of-state tangible property will as to realty
be only "a handkerchief thrown over something covered by a blanket
also." "I Taxes on personal property, however, are not so completely
localized, and the inclusion, in computing the personal property tax,
of all personal property without. regard to location would not clash so
violently with the underlying concept of this tax. Of course, the as-
sessors who administer the tax could hardly be expected to exhibit
more diligence in searching for out-of-state tangible property than they
now show in seeking for local tangibles." 2 But self-disclosure is not
entirely a dead letter, and corporations, estates, trusts, and even some
individuals maintain records of sonme accuracy by which tax returns
can be verified." 3 Perhaps more important are the property taxes on
railroads, utilities and similar enterprises, levied on a statewide basis
and centrally assessed," 4 whose effective base might be enlarged if
legislators were persuaded that constitutional barriers did not forbid.
Such an enlargement of the base would have to take account of the
108. BUREAU OF TEE CENSUS, FINANCING FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCALGOVERNMENTS:
1941 (1942) Table 5, p. 22; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROPERTY TAXATION: 1941 (1942).
109. HANSEN and PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN TEE NATIONAL ECONOMY
(1944) 274-83; GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1946) 344-8.
110. JENSEN, PROPERTY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1931) 83-4; SELIGMAN,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 19; Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U. S. 446 (1908).
111. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1946 Supp.) 92, quoting from Brown
v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189 N. E. 41, 43 (1934).
112. "Personal property . . . has been found to be so unreliable and inequitable a
source of public revenues that the personal property tax in most states is either a farce or a
corpse." Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 240,
242; cf. People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review, 351 Ill. 301, 184 N. E. 325 (1932); Kent,
Tax Litigation in Illinois (1934) 1 U. oz CHI. L. REV. 698.
113. Compare the return which led to Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S.
292 (1944).
114. JENSEN, op. cit. supra note 110, at 415-38.
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Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, though under prevailing
interpretations that clause does not relieve interstate commerce of the
duty of "paying its own way." 115
Death taxation is not subject to the residual restrictions of the Com-
merce Clause. States now typically tax the intangible property of resi-
dent decedents without regard to the location of the debtors, obligors,
or evidentiary instruments; and state practice prior to Frick v. Penn-
sylvania suggests that the legislators might prefer similarly to disregard
location in taxing tangible property. Of course, it will be argued in
opposition that the domiciliary state's power to tax intangibles is
ancillary to its power to regulate the devolution of such property and
that since it lacks the power to prescribe the devolution of out-of-state
realty and tangible personalty,116 it cannot tax their transfer.117 The
same type of argument has been urged against the imposition of estate
and inheritance taxes by the United States and has been repeatedly
rejected by the Supreme Court."" Similarly, the view that non-
domiciliary states cannot tax intangible property, because the succes-
sion thereto is controlled by the law of the domicile, is now thoroughly
discredited."-' For there is no reason why principles of the conflict of
115. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 254 (1938). No attempt
has been made herein to deal with the limitations upon the states' taxing powers that stem
from the Commerce Clause. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944);
cf. Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring, in International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Treasury,
322 U. S. 340, 352 el seq (1944). A recent discussion is Sutherland and Vinciguerra, The
Octroi and the Airplane (1946) 32 CORN. L. Q. 161.
116. The devolution of land is governed by the law of the situs, RFsTATE,.lrNr, CON-
FLIcT OF LAWS (1934) § 245. While in the distribution of chattels the state of their location
customarily follows the law of the decedent's domicile, it has the power to prescribe a differ-
ent mode of distribution. Id. at § 303, comment a.
117. Compare Lowndes, Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangibles (1930) 17 VA. L.
REv. 146, 153.
118. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56-61 (1900); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U. S. 345, 348-9 (1921). In Knowlton v. Moore, supra at 56, the Court pointed out that
there had been a federal inheritance tax as early as 1797 (1 STAT. 527), "adopted at a time
when the founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively partici-
pating in public affairs, thus giving a practical construction to the Constitution which they
had helped to establish." In spite of judicial and legislative precedent, the notion that
federal death taxation is unconstitutional dies hard. See Hearings before Senate Finance
Committee on H. R. 8974 (Revenue Act of 1935), 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935) 273. Current
agitation for tax reduction will no doubt play upon this theme. A straw in the wind is
ComnSTTEE ON POSTWAR TAx POLicy, A TAx PROGRAM- FOR A SOLVENT AMRIcA (1945) 163.
119. The argument was advanced by Mr. Justice Stone, concurring, and answered by
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204,
214, 216 (1930). Within a few months Mr. Justice Stone showed that he would apply the
doctrine only within narrow limits, Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930), while the
then majority gave it full rein. See First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932). For
the current view, recognizing that, even if the law of the domiciliary state controls the
transfer, it does so only by the grace of the non-domiciliary state, see State Tax Commission
v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942); cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S.
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laws which were evolved to mediate betwveen conflicting schemes for
the transmission of wealth at death should be employed to regulate
the tax practices of the several states.12 0 It is evident that confusion
would result if there were no way of harmonizing clashing rules for the
descent of the same property interest; no such confusion attends the
imposition of taxes by several sovereigns when the owner has enjoyed
privileges, benefits or protection in each, except in the unusual case
when the property is insufficient to meet all claims against it.12 1 "The
simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything
for which it can ask return." 122 Of course, the mere fact that multiple
death taxation is constitutionally impeccable does not mean that it is
socially desirable. Many states, feeling that they should yield to the
domiciliary state, have enacted reciprocal exemption statutes, 123 and
it may be that ultimate solution of the problem of multiple death taxa-
tion will be found in a relinquishment of claims by non-domiciliary
states, either unilaterally by enactment of such statutes or by joint
action in the form of interstate compacts.124 One advantage of vesting
the domiciliary state with jurisdiction over the entire estate, without
regard to location, is that it would prevent violation of the progressive
principle through splitting the tax brackets, a loophole which can be
only partially closed with existing devices. 25 Another route to the
same result would be a single federal system of death taxation, in the
revenue from which the states would share according to formula.12 In
189, 205-6 (1903): "What gives the debt [bank deposit] validity? Noihing but the fact
that the law of the place where the debtor is will make him pay. . . To test it, suppose
that New York should turn back the current of legislation and ...provide that all debts
hereafter contracted in New York and payable there should be extinguished by the death of
either party. Leaving constitutional considerations on one side, it is plain that the right of
the foreign creditor would be gone."
120. See Cahn, Time, Space, and Estate Tax (1941) 29 GEo. L. J. 677, 696, For the ex-
tent to which tax laws, willy-nilly, regulate the transmission of wealth, see Cahn, Federal
Regulation of Inheritance (1940) U. oF PA. L. REv. 297.
121. Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939).
122. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 311 U. S. 435,444 (1940).
123. See note 30 supra.
124. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316
U. S, 174, 184 (1942); Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitutlion-A
Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALn L. J. 685, 704.
125. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919); cf. Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Juris-
diction to Tax-Aftermath of Maxwell v. Bugbee (1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 756. For a related
problem, see Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit Clause (1935) 13
N. C. L. REv. 271, 282-3.
126. Hellerstein and Hennefeld have pointed out that the Supreme Court is not equipped
to settle the very real conflicts between the taxing powers and revenue needs of the several
states on the one hand and the requirements of a unified national economy on the other,
and they have coupled with their critical analysis a battery of legislative proposals. See
State Taxation in a National Economy (1941) 54 HARV. L. RPv. 949; and cf. Rodell, supra
note 1, at 1181-5. See also the comprehensive program of the Committee on Intergovern-
[Vol, 56: 640
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any event, the remedy for multiple taxation should not be -ought in
the Fourteenth Arhendment, and the states should be free to adopt
whatever treatment for out-of-state tangible property seems desirable,
without being coerced by constitutional bugbears which have already
been rejected as to intangible property and which have no greater
validity as applied to tangibles.
mental Fiscal Relations, SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 14-6, 235-8, 241,
469-96, discussed by MA-XWELL, THE FIsCAL ImPACT OF FEanaALMsu IN TaE UITED STA'Es
(1946) 350-3, and, in a more limited field, the recommendations of the Ciil Aeronautics
Board, H. R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). Parallel problems in the interna-
tional sphere are dealt with by Bloch and Heilemann, Inlernational Tax .Rdalions (1946)
55 YALE L. J. 1158; Bailey, Double Taxation in Regard to Deat; Duties (1945) 27 J. Coupr.
LEG. & INT. L., pts. III-IV, p. 46.
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